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OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Sharon Kremer appeals the District Court’s denial of her motion for new trial after
the jury returned a verdict against her in this age discrimination case.  
Kremer had been employed for 14 years by A Woman’s Place, a women’s shelter
in Bucks County, Pennsylvania.  She was terminated by her employer by a letter that
stated:  “We will no longer need your services in this position as of this date, June 24,
2004.”  (App. 145a.)  Kremer did not receive any further elaboration as to why she was
fired.  She was 58 years old at the time of trial.
Kremer brought suit based upon the Age Discrimination and Employment Act
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621.  In the course of the trial, the District Court allowed the
introduction of a series of written statements by non-testifying individuals.  The letters,
3written by two former residents of A Woman’s Place, reported Kremer’s involvement in
the expulsion of the residents from the shelter.  The residents had complained verbally
about the expulsion to a shelter supervisor, Sarah James, and Ms. James told them she
could not take their complaints anywhere unless they were in writing.  In May and June of
2004, the residents wrote the letters complaining about Kremer and gave them to Ms.
James, who passed them on to Kremer’s staff coordinator.  Kremer was terminated on
June 24, 2004.
Kremer’s counsel objected on the basis of hearsay.  The District Court ruled that
the letters were admissible because they were being offered not for the truth of the matter
asserted (namely, that the conduct of Kremer as indicated in the letter had actually
happened) but, rather, that they were probative of defendant’s reason for terminating
Kremer (namely, that her employer had been told that she had conducted herself
inappropriately).   No one disputed the fact that the letters were highly critical of some of 
Kremer’s behavior.  
The District Court ruled that the letters were admissible, but gave two limiting
instructions to the jury:  
One second, please.   Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the
author of that letter is not present, and so you cannot consider
that letter for the truth of the assertions that are contained in
the letter.   The letter is admissible for a very narrow legal
reason, which is that this is information that the defendants
said they received that caused them to act in a particular way. 
So, that’s the relvance of the letter, as something that the
4defendants had in front of them, which they say caused them
to act in a particular way.  
(App. 229.)
The trial court again instructed the jury:
All right.   Well again, these documents are not introduced for
the truth of the matter, rather as something that they relied
upon that caused them to do certain things.
(App. 232a.)
A verdict was returned for the defendant, and Kremer moved for a new trial.   The
District Court denied the motion, based upon its conclusion that the letters were
admissible.  
On appeal, Kremer urges that the admission of the evidence affected her
substantial rights and destroyed any chance of a fair verdict in her case.  She contends that
the evidence was offered to prove that she did, in fact, act as the letters indicated, and
therefore its admission violated the hearsay rule.  We disagree.  The District Court gave
not one instruction, but two, indicating to the jurors that the letters were admitted for a
very limited purpose, namely, that they formed the basis for the termination decision.  The
jurors were told they were not to consider them for the truth of what they contained. 
District courts are entitled to presume, as do we, that jurors follow instructions, as they
are told repeatedly that they must.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d 138,
148 (3d Cir. 2002); Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, 292 F.3d 375, 382-83 (3d Cir. 2002);
Loughman v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co., 6 F.3d 88, 105 (3d Cir. 1993).
5 Kremer also argues that defense counsel’s reference during closing argument to
the conduct set forth in the letters demonstrated that the letters were offered for their
truth, not for causation.  This argument is not persuasive.  Again, the District Court gave
the jury specific instructions that limited jurors’ consideration of the letters.  Kremer’s
counsel reminded the jury of the limiting instruction during his closing, but then argued
that “even if you were to consider it for the truth, it didn’t happen.”  (App. 348.)   Counsel
cannot have it both ways.  Further, counsel did not object to defense counsel’s closing
argument.
Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that because the letters were not
offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein, Kremer’s argument that they
were hearsay and inadmissible is not sound. 
In light of the foregoing, we will AFFIRM the order of the District Court.
